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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
JAMES LUIS GEDO 
Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 20040225-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, FROM A CONVICTION OF RESISTING OR 
INTERFERING WITH AN OFFICER IN THE DISCHARGE OF DUTY, A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR, BEFORE THE HONORABLE DEREK P. PULLAN 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether this Court should address the appellant's appeal when the appellant's 
brief fails to comply with the briefing requirements of Rule 24 Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
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Standard of Review. "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address 
arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App. 135, ^ [8, 47 
P.3dl07. 
2. Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that Provo City did not have to 
respond to frivolous motions that were filed against the advice of counsel. 
Standard of Review. An appellate court review of a district court's "discretion in 
tailoring appropriate conditions under which . . .[litigant], may commence and prosecute 
future lawsuits" is under the abuse of discretion standard. Tripati v. Seaman, 878 F.2d 
351(U.S.App.l989). 
3. Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that Gedo could not submit any of 
his own motions. 
Standard of Review. An appellate court review of a district court's "discretion in 
tailoring appropriate conditions under which . . .[litigant], may commence and prosecute 
future lawsuits" is under the abuse of discretion standard. Tripati v. Beanian, 878 F.2d 
351(U.S.App.l989). 
4. Whether the trial court erred when it declined to find that the police officer's 
entry onto the property was illegal, and that his continued presence on the property was a 
violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights. 
Standard of Review. "An appellate court reviews a trial court finding relative to a 
person's actual expectation of privacy under a clearly erroneous standard. The appellate 
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court reviews the conclusion as to whether society is willing to recognize the individual5s 
expectation of privacy as legitimate under a correction of error standard." State v. Holden, 
964 P.2d 318, 320 (Utah App. 1998). 
5. Whether the officer's alleged use of "deadly force," should provide a remedy 
that results in a dismissal similar to the exclusionary rule. 
Standard of Review. The appellate review of the appropriate use of legal 
conclusions regarding the exclusionary rule is under a "standard of correctness." State v. 
Jarman, 1999 UT App 269 \ 4, 987 P.2d 1284. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Provo City Code § 9,10,030 Interfering with Officer in Dishcarge of Duty 
It shall be unlawful for any person to do any act which interferes with, 
resists, molests or threatens any peace officer within the limits of 
Provo City, while in the discharge of his official duties. It shall be 
unlawful for any person to resist a lawful arrest whether made by a 
peace officer or by a private person. The fact the person being arrested 
believes the arrest to be in proper or unlawful shall not be a defense to 
a violation of this section if in fact it is a lawful arrest. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Gedo was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court with 
the belief that on or about August 9, 2001, James Luis Gedo committed the crimes of 
Disorderly Conduct, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-1021; 
Resisting or Interfering with Officer in the Discharge of Duty, a Class B Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Provo City Code § 9.10.030; and Assault on a Peace Officer, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4. (R. at 00003). 
On September 6, 2001, an arraignment was held before Judge Lynn W. Davis. 
Gedo was found by the Court to be indigent and Scott P. Card was appointed to represent 
Gedo. A pretrial conference was scheduled for October 30, 2001. (R. at 00006, 00005). 
At the October 30, 2001, hearing, Scott Card stated he had a conflict representing Gedo in 
this case. The court then appointed Gary Chrystler as conflict counsel for Gedo. (R. at 
00011-00012). On November 1, 2001, Gedo appeared with attorney Gary Chrystler for a 
pretrial conference before Judge Davis. Gedo filed pro se motions with the Court that 
were not accepted and he was instructed only to have his counsel file motions. A motion 
hearing was scheduled for January 14, 2002. (R. at 00018). 
On December 11, 2001, a Motion for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions 
and Request to Submit to Judge for Decision was filed. (R. at 00026). On December 14, 
2001, the Court granted Gedo's request and ordered all motions to be filed by January 31, 
lrThe charge of Disorderly Conduct, Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 was dismissed 
prior to the jury trial in this matter. 
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2002. The Court continued the hearing previously set for January 14, 2002, to March 4, 
2002. (R. at 00029). Gary Chrystler filed motions on behalf of Gedo on January 18, 2002, 
and February 21, 2002. These motions were handwritten by Gedo with a cover sheet 
which stated the motions were filed at the request of Gedo but against the advice of 
counsel. (R. at 00034, 00038). 
On March 4, 2002, a Hearing on the Motions was held before Judge Davis. Gedo 
failed to appear. Gedo subsequently appeared and signed a new promise to appear on 
April 23, 2002. (R. at 00042). On April 23, 2002, Gedo appeared at a Hearing on the 
Motions before Judge Davis. Gary Chrystler appeared and requested to withdraw as 
conflict counsel, which was allowed by the Court. (R. at 00046). 
On May 20, 2002, a Status Hearing was held before Judge Davis. The matter was 
heard with new conflict counsel, Laura H. Cabanilla. The matter was reassigned to Judge 
Guy R. Burningham in order to consolidate all of Gedo's open cases. (R. at 00055). On 
July 2, 2002, a pretrial conference was held and the case set for further proceedings on 
August 26, 2002. On August 26, 2002 the Court ordered discovery of police records 
involving Gedo for five (5) years prior to the date of the offense. (R. at 00066, 00063). 
On October 2, 2002, counsel for Gedo filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, a 
Motion in Limine, a Notice of Intention to Offer Statement of Unavailable Witness at 
Trial, and a Notice to Submit for Decision.2 (R. at 00071, 00073, 00076, 00087). The 
2The Notice to Submit for Decision was for motions filed through Gedo's counsel 
Gary Chrystler; motions that were filed against the advice of counsel. 
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prosecution responded to the Motion to Suppress Evidence and Motion in Limine on 
October 24, 2002. (R. at 00094, 00096). 
On October 28, 2002, this matter came before Judge Burningham. The Court held 
that Gedo's counsel could amend the Motion to Suppress Evidence by filing a more 
specific Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine. The matter was scheduled for oral 
arguments. (R. at 00099). 
On November 22, 2002, Laura Cabanilla filed a Motion to Dismiss, Motion in 
Limine, and Notice to Submit for Decision on the motion's filed by Gary Chrystler. (R. at 
00107, 00121, 00119). Additionally, Laura Cabanilla filed a Notice to Submit for 
Decision regarding Gedo's Notice of Intention to Offer Statement of Unavailable 
Witnesses at Trial. On December 12, 2002, the prosecution filed responses to Gedo's 
Motion to Dismiss, Motion in Limine, and Notice of Intention to Offer Statements of 
Unavailable Witnesses at Trial. (R. at 00127, 00133, 00141). 
On December 23, 2002, oral arguments were heard before Judge Burningham. 
Gedo's Motion to Dismiss was denied. The Court granted in part the Motion in Liminie 
regarding any injuries sustained by Gedo on the night in question, but denied the motion 
regarding prior acts, arrests, and/or incidents. (R. at 00146). 
On February 13, 2003, March 24, 2003, April 14, 2003, and April 28, 2003, 
counsel for Gedo filed packets of numerous motions by Gedo which were filed with a 
cover sheet stating that the motions were being filed at the request of Gedo but against the 
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advice of counsel. (R. at 00148, 00184, 00205, 00209). Gedo also filed his own motions, 
not through counsel, on February 13, 2003 and February 19, 2003. 
On February 19, 2003, a hearing was held before Judge Burningham. Provo City 
was instructed to file a response to Gedo's motions by March 10, 2003. On March 11, 
2003, Provo City filed a response to Gedo's pretrial motions. (R. at 00179). 
On March 24, 2003, a law and motion hearing was held before Judge Burningham. 
Gedo filed new motions with the court, and his counsel requested that the City respond to 
the motions. The City was ordered to respond to the motions according to the rules, but 
the court granted the City's motion to continue and allowed more time to respond. (R. at 
00182). 
On May 12, 2003, a hearing on the motions was held before Judge Burningham. 
The motions filed that day by Gedo, as well as all the other motions that were filed 
against counsel's advice, were found to be not relevant to the case and stricken without 
need for the City to respond. After Gedo waived his right to a speedy trial, the court 
granted Gedo's motion for a six (6) month continuance of the matter. Gedo was ordered 
not to file any further motions that were against the advice of counsel. (R. at 00228). 
On July 21, 2003, the matter came before Judge Burningham on a Motion to 
Withdraw as Counsel filed by Laura Cabanilla. After entering into an agreement with 
Gedo, regarding Gedo's conduct, Laura Cabanilla agreed to stay on as counsel. (R. at 
00255-00256). 
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A jury trial was held on January 21 and 22, 2004, before Judge Derek P. Pullan. 
Gedo was found not guilty of Assault on a Police Officer and guilty of Resisting or 
Interfering with an Officer in the Discharge of Duty. (R. at 00342-00348). On February 9, 
2004, Gedo was sentenced to the statutory maximum for a Class B Misdemeanor, with all 
but twenty (20) days of jail suspended. (R at 00381-00382). On March 9, 2004, defendant 
filed a timely appeal. (R. at 00402). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The circumstances surrounding the incident leading to the charges against Gedo 
were as follows: The property located at 363 West 800 North, Provo, is a duplex owned 
by Dane Kay. The duplex consists of an upstairs residence and a downstairs apartment. 
(T.00405:87 at 23-25, T.00405:88 at 1). Gedo was a tenant in the basement apartment. 
(T.00405:89 at 22-24). The attached carport is parking for the upstairs residence. 
(T.00405:97 at 24). The side patio is also for the upstairs residence.(T.00405:98 at 7-24). 
Gedo, who was renting the downstairs apartment, had no authority or control over the 
carport or side patio areas. (T.00405:111 at 9-24). 
On the morning of August 9, 2001, the upstairs residence was to be vacant. 
(T.00405:90 at 2). Dane Kay, the owner of the property, testified that two Russians, 
Sergeia and Dennis, had been sleeping in the upstairs residence at night without his 
permission. (T.00405:90 at 20-25 to T.00405:91 at 1-25). After four or five conversations 
regarding the Russians sleeping in the upstairs residence, Dane Kay told the Russians 
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again that they needed to sleep somewhere else because he was getting the residence 
ready to rent. Dane Kay secured the residence and told the Russians that the residence 
was locked up and he expected to not see them around anymore. (T.00405:92 at 1-14). 
When Dane Kay came back to the residence in the afternoon of August 9, 2001, he 
noticed that there had been forced entry into the upstairs residence with damage. 
(T.00405:92 at 14-17). 
Dane Kay testified that Sergeia and Gedo were at the property on August 9, 2001. 
Dane Kay told Sergeia that if he was at the property anymore he would call the police. 
(T.00405:93 at 9-18). Dane Kay also told Gedo that if the Russians were there that night 
he was going to call the police. (T.00405:93 at 20-22). 
Dane Kay testified that he called his brother, Stacey Kay, between 10:00 and 10:30 
p.m. and asked him to drive by the property to see if the Russians were there. (T.00405:95 
at 14-22). Stacey Kay called Dane Kay back indicating that the two Russians were at the 
residence. With this information Dane Kay called the police and gave detailed 
information stating that Sergeia and Dennis were trespassing. (T.00405:95 at 21-25, 
T.00405:96 at 1-21, T.00405:109 at 17-20). 
Officer Rich Bunderson testified that on August 9, 2001, at approximately 11:00 
p.m., he was dispatched to 363 West 800 North, Provo, to investigate a complaint of two 
males on the east side of the home on the patio. They had been asked to leave the 
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property and they would not. (T.00405:121 at 11-22). Officer Bunderson assumed the 
complainant lived at the location. (T.00405:122 at 25, R.00405:123 at 1-2). Officer 
Bunderson parked his vehicle about half a block east of the residence on the opposite 
side of the street. (T.00405:123 at 20-22). 
Officer Bunderson proceeded to the front door of the upstairs residence to speak 
with the complainant whom he believed lived at the residence. As he proceeded up the 
driveway to cut across the lawn to the front door, he shined his flashlight through the 
carport to the patio area where he believed the trespassers were located. (T.00405:126 at 
11-19. T.00405:128 at 5-14). 
Officer Bunderson testified that when he was about five to ten feet up the 
driveway on his way to the front door of the upstairs residence (T.00405:131 at 1-12) he 
heard a voice start yelling vulgarities at him from the area where he shined his flashlight 
on the two males. (T.00405:128 at 19-20, T.00405:129 at 1-2, T.00405:131at 8). The 
individual yelling was Gedo. Officer Bunderson stopped and saw Gedo coming around 
the side of the house quickly walking toward him and still yelling. (T.00405:130 at 15-
25). Gedo continued to yell at Officer Bunderson with vulgar language telling him to get 
out of there and off the property. Officer Bunderson testified that he tried to explain to 
Gedo that he was a police officer and the reason he was called to the property. 
(T.00405:131 at 17-23). 
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Officer Bunderson testified that Gedo continued yelling at him and that Gedo 
quickly approached Officer Bunderson with his hand outstretched toward Officer 
Bunderson. Gedo came close enough to the officer that if the officer had not moved Gedo 
would have pushed him with his outstretched hand. Officer Bunderson took a step back 
and hit Gedo's hand away so Gedo would not push him. (T.00405:132 13-18). 
Gedo continued to yell vulgarity at the officer and suddenly put his right hand 
behind his back as though he was reaching for something. Officer Bunderson testified 
that he was in fear that Gedo was reaching for a weapon. Officer Bunderson reached for 
his weapon and drew it out of his holster. Officer Bunderson told Gedo to bring his hand 
out in front of him so he could see his hand. (T.00405:134 at 9-24). After several requests 
from Officer Bunderson to bring his hand out, Gedo flung both his hands forward in a 
threatening aggressive manner. Officer Bunderson observed that Gedo did not have a 
weapon, just keys. The officer holstered his weapon and got out his pepper spray. 
(T.00405:135atl-21). 
Officer Bunderson testified that he again tried to calm Gedo down to explain his 
reason for being at the property and that he was called by the owner. Officer Bunderson 
stated that Gedo continued yelling so that the officer could not conduct an investigation. 
(T.00405:136 at 13-24). Officer Bunderson decided he needed to take Gedo into custody 
for impeding his investigation, assault, and disorderly conduct. (T.00405:137 at 15-18). 
Gedo continued to yell at the officer to leave or there would be big problems. Gedo 
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turned and started walking toward the back part of the carport. Officer Bunderson, 
knowing there was another person in the back area of the carport, reached out and 
attempted to arrest Gedo by grabbing his left elbow. Gedo forcefully swung around, made 
contact with Officer Bunderson, took an aggressive stance, and yelled, "Come on let's 
go." Officer Bunderson took this as a call for him to fight so Officer Bunderson sprayed 
Gedo in the face with pepper spray. (T.00405:138 at 19-25, T. 00405:139 atl-6, T.00405: 
140 at 10-12). Officer Bunderson then reached out, grabbed Gedo by the shoulders and 
took Gedo to the ground where he hoped to handcuff him and control him. (T.00405: 141 
at 16-21). During this struggle, Gedo and Officer Bunderson ended up in an area between 
the carport and side patio. (T.00405:142 at 7-10). Officer Bunderson testified that at some 
point during the altercation he called for back up units to respond immediately. 
(T.00405:139 at 16-22). 
Officer Peterson arrived to assist Officer Bunderson who was still struggling to 
handcuff Gedo and gain control of the situation. After several minutes of struggling with 
Gedo, the officers were unable to control him. During the struggle, Officer Petersen saw 
Gedo attempt to strike Officer Bunderson. Officer Peterson then struck Gedo once in the 
back of the head with a closed fist while holding a small utility belt flashlight. Officer 
Peterson testified that he felt his knuckles make contact with Gedo's head and that it was 
possible the edge of the flashlight he was holding also made contact with Gedo's head. 
During the trial, it was stipulated that if Dr. Keith Hooker was called to testify that 
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Gedo's injury was consistent with a hard object having struck the defendant. The officers 
were then able to gain control of Gedo and handcuff him. (T 00405:46 at 25, T.00405:47 
at 1-13, T.00405:48 at 1-25, T. 00406: 47 at 25). 
After arresting Gedo, Officer Bunderson was able to continue his investigation of 
the trespassing. In speaking with the property owner's brother, Stacey Kay, who arrived 
after Gedo was arrested, Officer Bunderson determined that Gedo lived in the basement 
apartment; that there were actually two additional males on the side patio with Gedo, and 
that the two males were the Russians that had been previously trespassed from the 
property by the owner. The Russians were given a formal trespass warning stating that if 
they came back to the property they would be issued citations or arrested. (T.00405:149 at 
20-25, T.00405: 150 at 1-5). 
The paramedics, responding to Officer Bunderson5s request, arrived and attempted 
to treat Gedo. Gedo was aggressive with the paramedics, he was taken to the hospital for 
possible treatment, and then transported to the county jail. (T. 00405:150 at 6-10). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The jury found Gedo guilty of violating Provo City Code § 9.10.030, Resisting or 
Interfering with Officer in Discharge of Duty, a Class B misdemeanor. Gedo challenges 
the verdict and appeals for dismissal of the charge. 
Gedo's brief is inadequate and not in compliance with Utah R. App. P. Rule 24. 
Gedo's brief does not contain citations to the record on appeal or provide a standard of 
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appellate review with supporting authority in the Statement of the Issues Presented for 
Review. 
The City is not required to respond to motions pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which do not apply to this case. This is a criminal case and the URCrP Rule 12 
governs in this case. 
The trial court did not commit an error that violated Gedo's constitutional rights by 
not allowing Gedo to file his own motions. The court has the authority to make 
appropriate orders to regulate the conduct of the parties in proceedings. Gedo chose to 
exercise his mutually exclusive right to the assistance of counsel in this criminal 
proceeding. His attorney had ultimate control over the tools used to accomplish trial 
objectives. 
There was no violation of Gedo's Fourth Amendment right to be free of an 
unreasonable search and seizure. The police officer had a duty to respond to the 
complaint of trespassing and was legally on the property attempting to fulfill his duty 
when he was confronted by Gedo. Gedo fails to establish any prejudice to his own 
constitutional rights. 
The exclusionary rule does not provide a remedy for Gedo. The prime purpose of 
the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police conduct in the realm of search and 
seizures. Gedo has misinterpreted the purpose of the exclusionary rule. Furthermore, there 
are no findings that the police officers used deadly or excessive force in effecting the 
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arrest of Gedo. Gedo was the aggressor throughout the incident. Gedo interfered with and 
resisted the officers while in the discharge of their duties. 
ARGUMENT 
L APPELLANT'S BRIEF IS INADEQUATE AND NOT IN COMPLIANCE 
WITH RULE 24 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are 
not adequately briefed... .When considering arguments on appeal, we look to the 
requirements of Rule 24 to determine whether an appellant has adequately briefed the 
issue. Rule 24 requires that an appellant's brief contain [a] statement of the issues 
presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority; and (A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved 
in the trial court. . . . In addition, this rule requires that the 'argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including 
the ground for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.'" State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App. 
135,ffl[8,9,47P.3 107. 
"[T]o permit meaningful appellate review, briefs must comply with the briefing 
requirements sufficiently to 'enable us to understand . . . what particular errors were 
allegedly made, where in the record those errors can be found, and why, under applicable 
authorities, those errors are material ones necessitating reversal or other relief.'" Burns v. 
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Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197,199 (Utah App. 1996); see also State v. Garner, 2002 UT 
App. 234, | 8 , 52 P.3d 467. 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(7) states that "[t]he statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A 
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All 
statement of the facts and references to proceeding below shall be supported by citations 
to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule." Under Utah R. App. P. Rule 
24(e) "[rjeferences shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant 
to Rule 11(b).. . ." Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(e). 
"When an appellant's argument contains no citations to the record and no legal 
authority, a court declines to reach the issues." Utah v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 
1992). Gedo fails to support his arguments with citations to the record or with any legal 
analysis or authority. In Gedo's entire brief only two cases are used to support the issues 
in the brief or provide any meaningful analysis to his argument. 
Gedo's brief fails to comply with several of the briefing requirements of Rule 24 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The brief does not contain citations to the 
record on appeal. Additionally, the brief fails to provide a standard of appellate review 
with supporting authority in the statement of the issues presented for review and does not 
provide legal analysis or authority to support all of the issues in his brief. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT RULED THAT PROVO 
CITY DID NOT HAVE TO RESPOND TO FRIVOLOUS MOTIONS FILED 
AGAINST THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL 
A. Counsel for Gedo has not adequately briefed this issue. 
"[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988). 
In this case, Gedo has not adequately briefed the issue in Point One of his brief 
(Aplt. Brf. at 17), and this Court should not address it. In Point I of Gedo's brief, Gedo 
cites to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which do not apply to this case. (Aplt. Brf. at 
17). This is a criminal case and the URCrP Rule 12 for motions governs. URCrP Rule 
12(a) states that u[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion, which, 
unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in accordance with this rule. 
A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the ground upon which it is made 
and relief sought. . . ." There is no language in URCrP Rule 12 that obligates the 
prosecutor to respond to motions. 
B. Court has authority to control proceedings. 
Courts have the authority to "provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before 
it or its officers . . .[and] to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of its 
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial 
proceeding before it in every matter." (Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(3)(5)). Furthermore, 
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URCrP Rule 33 states, "[t]he court may make appropriate orders regulating the conduct 
of officers, parties, spectators and witnesses prior to and during the conduct of any 
proceeding." (emphasis added). Accordingly, on May 12, 2003, Judge Burningham, 
having considered the motions, found that the motions Gedo filed that day as well as all 
the other motions filed against counsel's advice were not relevant to the case and that the 
City need not respond. Judge Burningham either denied or struck the motions and ordered 
Gedo not to file any more motions that were against the advice of counsel. (R at 00228). 
The mere fact that Gedo received an unfavorable result in the trial court does not 
give rise to the conclusion that the trial court erred when it did not require the prosecution 
to respond to the many frivolous motions filed by Gedo. "To establish prejudice, it is not 
enough to claim that the alleged errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome or 
could have had a prejudicial effect on the fact finders. To be found sufficiently 
prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively show that a 'reasonable probability5 exists that, 
but for . . . error, the result would have been different. 'Reasonable probability is defined 
as that sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the verdict.'" State v. 
Grueber, 776 P.2d 70,76 (Utah App. 1989). URCrP Rule 30(a) states that "[a]ny error, 
effect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall 
be disregarded." 
In this case, if Provo City responded to the many motion's filed by Gedo, Provo 
City would have opposed the motions setting forth reasons the motions should be denied. 
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Provo City agreed with the court's decision that the motions and any responses to the 
motions would not have changed the outcome. Gedo has not established that he was 
prejudiced by the court's decision not to consider any pro se motions and has failed to 
show that a reasonable probability existed that if all the frivolous motions filed by the 
defendant to the trial court were responded to by the prosecution that the outcome would 
have been different. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT INSTRUCTED GEDO 
NOT TO SUBMIT ANY OF HIS OWN MOTIONS 
In POINT II of Gedo's brief, Gedo alleges that the trial court should have allowed 
him to file his own motions with the court; motions not filed by his attorney. Gedo argues 
that not allowing him to file these motions was an infringement of his constitutional 
rights. (Aplt.Brf.at21). 
Right to assistance of counsel is mutually exclusive. 
"The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees each criminal 
defendant the right to assistance of counsel." State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 f 15, 979 P.2d 
799 (quoting State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183,187 (Utah 1987)). It is well established that 
the Sixth Amendment also grants an accused the fundamental right to defend him- or 
herself in person. Id. at \ 15 (quoting Faretta v. California, All U.S. 806, 818-21, 45 
L.ed. 2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975)); Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187 & n.6.; State v. 
Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1987). These mutually exclusive rights must be 
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construed in harmony with each other as far as possible." Id. at f 15 (See Faretta, All 
U.S. at 820-21) (emphasis added). 
In this case, Gedo chose to exercise his right to the assistance of counsel in his 
criminal proceeding and the "attorney has ultimate control over the means used to 
accomplish trial objective." State v. Valenica, 2001 UT App 159, 1J16, 27 P.3d 573.3 The 
defendant's counsel is not an assistant. "The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment 
contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, 
shall be an aide to a willing defendant.... In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a 
master; and the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which 
the [Sixth] Amendment insists. It is true that when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer 
manage and present his case, law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to 
make binding decisions of trial strategy in many areas." Faretta v. California, All U.S. 
806; 95 S.Ct 2525 at 817. 
Gedo prepared numerous handwritten, unintelligible motions with no viable 
argument that dealt with the issues in the case and had no basis of law to respond to. 
Gedo requested that his attorney submit these frivolous motions and Gary Chrystler did so 
3In State v. Valencia, 2001 UT 15, 27 P.3d 573, the appellant argued that the trial 
court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by refusing to appoint substitute 
counsel. The appellant, in one of his arguments on the issues, complains that counsel 
would not file discovery motions or a motion to suppress at his request. The court found 
that the attorney had ultimate control over the means used to accomplish trial objectives. 
Counsel was under no obligation to comply with appellant's desire because motions are a 
means used to accomplish trial objectives. 
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on January 18, 2002, and February 21, 2002, with a cover sheet which stated the motions 
were filed at the request of Gedo but against the advice of counsel (R. at 00034, 00038) 
and Laura Cabanilla again on February 13, 2003, March 24, 2003, April 14, 2003, and 
April 28, 2003. (R. at 00148, 00184, 00205, 00209). Gedo also filed his own motions, not 
through counsel, on February 13, 2003, and February 19, 2003. 
In this case, the trial court did not violate Gedo's constitutional rights when the 
court clerks instructed the defendant to file motions through counsel (R. at 00018) or 
when Judge Burningham ordered Gedo not to file any further motions that were against 
the advice of counsel. (R. at 00228). Gedo has not established that he was prejudiced by 
the court's decision not to consider any pro se motions. He has not identified what the 
those motions would have been and has not established that they would have prevailed. 
As stated previously, the courts have the authority to "provide for the orderly 
conduct of proceedings before it or its officers . . .[and] to control in the furtherance of 
justice the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner 
connected with a judicial proceeding before it in every matter." (Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-
5(3)(5)). Furthermore, URCrP Rule 33 states "[t]he court may make appropriate orders 
regulating the conduct of officers, parties, spectators and witnesses prior to and during the 
conduct of any proceeding." Accordingly, on May 12, 2003, Judge Burningham, having 
considered the motions, found that the motions Gedo filed that day as well as all the other 
motions filed against counsel's advice were not relevant to the case and that the City need 
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not respond. Judge Burningham either denied or struck the motions and ordered Gedo not 
to file any motions that were against the advice of counsel. (R at 00228). 
IV. THE POLICE OFFICER'S ENTRY ONTO THE PROPERTY WAS LEGAL 
AND THE OFFICER'S CONTINUED PRESENCE ON THE PRIVATE 
PROPERTY DID NOT VIOLATE GEDO'S FOURTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS 
Utah Code Ann.§ 53-13-103(l)(a) states that a law enforcement officer's "primary 
and principal duties consist of the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement 
of criminal statutes or ordinances of this state or any of its political subdivisions." Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-914(1) Police officers - authority, states that u[w]ithin the boundaries 
of the municipality, police officers have the same authority to preserve the public peace, 
prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, protect persons and property, 
remove nuisances existing in the public streets, road, and highways, enforce every law 
relating to the suppression of offenses, and perform all the duties required of them by 
ordinance or resolution." 
In this case, there was no violation of Gedo's Fourth Amendment right to be free 
of an unreasonable search and seizure. In his capacity as a community caretaker, Officer 
Bunderson entered the properly legally in response to a call from the owner of the 
property that two people were trespassing and that they were located on the patio on the 
east side of his home. (T.00405:121 at 11-22). It was within Officer Bunderson's duty 
and scope of authority to respond to this residence. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has found that an "open pathway to the front door was an 
implied invitation to members of the public to enter thereon." State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 
1056, 1058 (Utah App. 1992). Officer Bunderson was lawfully on a pathway to the front 
door when he shined his flashlight in the carport patio area where people were reported to 
be. (T.00405:126 at 11-19. T.00405:128 at 5-14). When Gedo approached Officer 
Bunderson from the side patio area, the officer did not know the owner did not live there 
and that Gedo was a renter of the downstairs apartment. The officer had no knowledge 
whether Gedo was a trespasser. (T.00405:122 at 22, T.00405:123 at 1-15). Gedo did not 
give Officer Bunderson a chance to explain why he was there or to find out who he was. 
Gedo instantly engaged in threatening and disorderly behavior toward Officer Bunderson. 
(T.00405:131 at 17-23) (T.00405:136 at 13-24). 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees, "The right of people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.5 The Amendment protects persons against unreasonable searches of 'their 
persons [and] houses' and thus indicates that the Fourth Amendment is a personal right 
that must be invoked by an individual." Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83; 119 S. Ct. 469 
(U.S. 1998) at 88. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. But to the extent 
to which the Fourth amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are. 
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The capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends upon whether the 
person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the invaded place." Id. at 89. 
"[I]n order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must 
demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and 
that his expectation is reasonable,.... '" Id. at 83. 
Common areas that are shared by other tenants in an apartment house are not 
under the exclusive control of one individual so as to create a legitimate expectation of 
privacy. "A person's house is specifically identified as a constitutionally protected area 
and is without question,... accorded the full range of fourth amendment protections. The 
reasonable presumption of an expectation of privacy in ones home, however, does not 
extend automatically to open parking lots shared by tenants [common areas] of an 
apartment house " State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1059 (Utah App. 1992). 
In this case, Gedo fails to establish any prejudice to his own constitutional rights 
because he was not a person aggrieved by the alleged unlawful entry or search and 
seizure. Gedo had no expectation of privacy in the carport or patio where the altercation 
with Officer Bunderson and other police officers took place and had no authority to tell 
the officer to leave. The property located at 363 West 800 North, Provo, is a duplex 
owned by Dane Kay. The duplex consists of an upstairs residence and a downstairs 
apartment. (T.00405:87 at 23-25, T.00405:88 at 1). At the time of the incident, the 
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upstairs residence was vacant and Gedo was a tenant in the basement apartment. 
(T.00405:89 at 22-24). The carport is parking for the upstairs residence. (T.00405:97 at 
24). The patio is also for the upstairs residence. (T.00405:98 at 7-24). Gedo who was 
renting the downstairs apartment had no authority or control over the carport or side patio. 
(T.00405:111 at 9-24). Dane Kay, the owner of the property, had authority and control 
over the vacant upstairs residence, the carport, and the adjoining side patio. Dane Kay, the 
owner of the property, requested that officers respond and investigate trespassers on his 
property. 
Furthermore, the side patio and carport are common areas of the property. If Gedo 
shared those common areas with other tenants he would have no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in these areas. 
V. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
RENDERS WRONGFULLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE 
AND DOES NOT, BY ITSELF, RESULT IN A CASE BEING DISMISSED 
A. Exclusionary rule as a remedy for Gedo is not appropriate. 
In Point IV of Gedo5s brief, Gedo suggests that the exclusionary rule results in 
dismissal of charges. Gedo alleges that the "purpose of the exclusionary rule has been to 
provide a remedy for a person when police misconduct has been such that it would be 
unfair for the prosecution to profit from the misconduct or illegally seized evidence and 
use it against the defendant, and it was intended as public policy, to effect a remedy other 
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than the ability to sue civilly for money damages." Gedo (Aplt. Brf at 29). Gedo has 
misinterpreted the purpose of the exclusionary rule in this case. 
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to punish police for unlawful search 
and seizures but to deter police from unlawful search and seizures. "The prime purpose of 
the exclusionary rule, if not the sole one, is to deter future unlawful police conduct. The 
rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights 
generally through its deterrent effect." State v. Zieglemean, 905 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah App. 
1995). "The exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and 
derivative (the 'fruit of unlawful police conduct'), obtained in violation of an individual's 
constitutional statutory rights. Courts view the exclusionary rule as a necessary deterrent 
to unlawful police behavior, one which prevents the police from benefitting from their 
illegalities." State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30; \ 1162, 76 P.3d 1159. 
"[T]he exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right per se, but rather a judicially 
created mechanism to deter unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Jarman, 1999 
UT App 269, \ 6, 987 P.2d 1284. Also, the legislature has made law that "[w]hen any 
wire, electronic, or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of 
the communication and no evidence derived from it may be received in evidence in any 
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, 
agency regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the state, or a political 
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subdivision of the state, if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this 
chapter." (Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-7) 
In this case, Gedo alleges that this case should be referred back to the trial court 
for findings that police misconduct occurred. And that the Court should find that the 
exclusionary rule or a dismissal of charges is appropriate as a deterrent to police 
misconduct. (Applt. Brf. at 30-31). 
In this case, there has been no illegally seized evidence where the exclusionary rule 
would come into play as a deterrent to police misconduct in the realm of illegal search 
and seizures. Furthermore, there are no factual findings from the court that when Officer 
Peterson struck Gedo once in the back of the head with a closed fist while holding a 
flashlight that police misconduct occurred. (T 00405:46 at 25, T.00405:47 at 1-13, 
T.00405:48 at 1-25, T. 00406: 47 at 25). Gedo has no grounds to suggest and offers no 
authority to support the use of the exclusionary rule to have charges dismissed as a 
remedy to a perceived misconduct. 
B. The alleged use of "deadly force55 by police to effect Gedo's arrest is unfounded. 
Gedo further purposes that a dismissal of the charge would be appropriate as a 
deterrent to police misconduct as it relates to his arrest. In this case, Gedo alleges that the 
police used "deadly force" when trying to lawfully arrest Gedo and the remedy for Gedo 
would be a dismissal of the charge. (Aplt. Brf. at 31). 
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In this case, the police officers used reasonable force in order to get Gedo under 
control and to arrest him. There are no factual findings that the police used excessive or 
deadly force in their efforts to arrest Gedo who was resisting and interfering with the 
officers in the discharge of their duties. 
According to Utah case law, "deadly force is force which is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury." State v. Quada, 918 P.2d 883 (Utah App. 1996). Serious bodily 
injury means "bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, 
protracted loss of impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or creates a 
substantial risk of death." State in the Interest of William N. Besendorfer, Jr., a person 
less than eighteen years of age, 568 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah 1977). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-7 states, "[i]f a person is being arrested and flees or 
forcibly resists after being informed of the intention to make the arrest, the person 
arresting may use reasonable force to effect the arrest." "[A] person may not lawfully 
resist an arrest initiated by a peace officer taken within the course of the officer's duties. 
Where the officer is not acting wholly outside the scope of his or her authority, the police 
action may not be resisted." Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah App. 
1996).4 
4
 In Smoot, the defendant was told by police that they were going to place him 
under arrest for his outstanding warrants. The defendant tried to flee when the officer 
tried to effect an arrest. The officer grabbed the defendant and pulled him to the ground. 
The defendant continued to struggle and kept pushing up, attempting to escape. Finally, 
unable to subdue the defendant the officer struck the defendant in the head two or three 
times, at which point the defendant stopped struggling and allowed himself to be 
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In this case, the officer did not use excessive or deadly force to effect the arrest of 
Gedo. The facts show that Gedo was the aggressor and was resisting arrest. Officer 
Bunderson was at the property pursuing an investigation of trespassing. (T.00405: 121 
atl8-22). Gedo approached Officer Bunderson in an aggressive manner yelling at the 
officer. Officer Bunderson tried to explain to Gedo his reason for being on the property. 
Gedo continued to yell and be aggressive with the officer. (T. 00405: 131-139). Gedo 
was out of control and engaged in a physical altercation with Officer Bunderson. (T. 
00405: at 138-146). Officer Peterson arrived to assist Officer Bunderson who was still 
struggling to handcuff Gedo and gain control of the situation. After several minutes of 
struggling with Gedo, the officers were unable to control him. During the struggle, 
Officer Petersen saw Gedo attempt to strike Officer Bunderson, whereupon Officer 
Peterson struck Gedo once in the back of the head with a closed fist while holding a small 
handcuffed. 
The defendant's proposed jury instructions dealt with his alleged right to resist 
arrest when the police use excessive force. The trial judge refused to submit the 
defendant's jury instructions stating that a person may lawfully resist an arrest initiated by 
a peace officer taken within the course of the officer's duties. The defendant, in his 
appeal challenged the trial judge's decision that the defendant's proposed jury 
instructions did not accurately state the applicable law. 
The Appellate Court concluded that u[w] here the officer is not acting wholly 
outside the scope of his or her authority, the police action may not be resisted." The 
Appellate Court found the trial court did not error in finding that the force used by the 
police was "not excessive" and "reasonable" in view of the circumstances. The Court 
found that there was no indication in the case that the police were doing anything other 
than diligently pursuing an official police investigation, that the defendant was the 
aggressor in the situation, and the police used reasonable force to effect the arrest of a 
person resisting. 
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utility belt flashlight. Officer Peterson testified that he felt his knuckles make contact 
with Gedo's head and that it was possible the edge of the flashlight he was holding also 
made contact with Gedo's head. During the trial, it was stipulated that if Dr. Keith 
Hooker was called to testify that Gedo's injury was consistent with a hard object having 
struck the defendant. The officers were then able to gain control of Gedo and handcuff 
him. (T 00405:46 at 25, T.00405:47 at 1-13, T.00405:48 at 1-25, T. 00406: 47 at 25). 
In sum, Gedo's challenges presented in his brief do not present a basis to allow for 
any remedies or dismissal of the charge of Interfering with an Officer in the Discharge of 
Duty. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Provo City asks this Court to affirm the trial court's 
verdict finding Gedo guilty of Interfering with an Officer in the Discharge of Duty. 
DATED this 20^ day of June, 2005. 
STEPHEN H. SCHREINER 
Counsel for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
RULES 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(7) 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(e) 
URCrP Rule 12 
URCrP Rule 30(a) 
URCrP Rule 33 
STATE STATUES 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-914(1) 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103(10)(a) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-7 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-7 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5-(3)(5) 
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RULES 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(7) 
The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of the facts and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(e) 
References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant 
to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed 
statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published 
depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover pages of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right comer and each separately numbered 
page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. 
References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to 
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages 
of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
URCrP Rule 12 
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, which, 
unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in accordance with this rule. 
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A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon which it is made 
and the relief sought. A motion need not be accompanied by a memorandum unless 
required by the court. 
(b) Request to Submit for Decision. When the time for filing a response to a 
motion and the reply has passed, either party may file a request to submit the motion for 
decision. The request shall be a separate pleading captioned "Request to Submit for 
Decision.ff The Request to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion 
was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply 
memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. The 
notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If no party files a request, 
the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or request, including 
request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination 
without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. 
(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or 
information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to 
charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time 
during the pendency of the proceeding; 
(B) motions to suppress evidence; 
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(C) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or. 
(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 76-3-402 shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior to the date of 
sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within ten days of the entry of 
conviction. Motions for a reduction of criminal offense pursuant to Utah Code Section 
76-3-402 may be raised at any time after sentencing upon proper service of the motion on 
the appropriate prosecuting entity. 
(d) Motions to suppress. A motion to suppress evidence shall: 
(1) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed; 
(2) set forth the standing of the movant to make the application; and. 
(3) specify sufficient legal and factual grounds for the motion to give the 
opposing party reasonable notice of the issues and to enable the court to 
determine what proceedings are appropriate to address them. 
If an evidentiary hearing is requested, no written response to the motion by the 
non-moving party is required, unless the court orders otherwise. At the 
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court may provide a reasonable time 
for all parties to respond to the issues of fact and law raised in the motion and at 
the hearing. 
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(e) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court for 
good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where factual issues 
are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the record. 
(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make 
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute 
waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver. 
(g) Except injustices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at 
the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are 
made orally. 
(h) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the 
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be continued 
for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or information. 
Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect provisions of law relating to a statute of 
limitations. 
URCrP Rule 30(a) 
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
URCrP Rule 33 
The court may make appropriate order regulating the conduct of officers, parties, 
spectators and witnesses prior to and during the conduct of any proceeding. 
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STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-914(1) 
(1) Within the boundaries of the municipality, police officers have the same 
authority as deputy sheriffs, including at all times the authority to preserve the public 
peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, protect persons and 
property, remove nuisances existing in the public streets, roads, and highways, enforce 
every law relating to the suppression of offenses, and perform all duties required of them 
by ordinance or resolution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103(l)(a) 
"Law enforcement officer" means a sworn and certified peace officer who is an 
employee of a law enforcement agency that is part of or administered by the state or any 
of it political subdivisions, and whose primary and principal duties consist of the 
prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of criminal statutes or ordinances 
of this state, or any of its political subdivisions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-7 
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after being informed of the 
intention to make the arrest, the person arresting may use reasonable force to effect the 
arrest... 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-7 
When any wire, electronic, or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of 
the contents of the communication and no evidence derived from it may be received in 
evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, 
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of 
the state, or a political subdivision of the state, if the disclosure of that information would 
be in violation of this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(3)(5) 
Every court has authority to: 
(3) provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its officers; 
(5) control in furtherance of justice the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of 
all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it in every 
matter; 
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